

# Disagreement about Inflation and the Yield Curve

by Paul Ehling, Michael Galmeyer, Christian Heyerdahl-Larsen, Philipp Illeditsch

**Harjoat S. Bhamra**

Imperial College & UBC

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# Outline

- Why care about the term structure (real and nominal)
- Bond yields and the SDF
- Real yields and inflation
- Main theoretical result
- Comments

# Why care about the term structure of interest rates?

Term structure tells us

- nominal rates at which the government can borrow and the rate at which investors are willing lend to the government
- crucial for investment decisions of firms, savings decisions of consumers, and policy decisions.

Can use yield spreads for forecasting

- future short yields (Campbell and Shiller, 1991; Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2005; Fama and Bliss, 1987)
- real activity (Ang et al., 2006; Estrella and Hardouvelis, 1991; Hamilton and Kim, 2002; Harvey, 1988) and inflation (Fama, 1990; Mishkin, 1990)

Monetary policy:

- central bank can move the short end of the yield curve, but long term yields important for aggregate demand, e.g. long term mortgage rates
- term structure model: short term yields  $\rightarrow$  long term yields

Debt policy:

- how much to issue and when.
- how does this impact term structure?

# This paper

- Inflation impacts real yields
- Why?
  - Differences in beliefs about inflation lead to consumption risk sharing across agents.
  - Consumption allocations impacted by differences in beliefs about inflation.
  - Real SDF impacted by differences in beliefs about inflation.

# Bond yields and the SDF

- real and nominal SDF

$$\underbrace{\xi^*(t)}_{\text{nominal SDF}} = \frac{\underbrace{\xi(t)}_{\text{real SDF}}}{\underbrace{\pi(t)}_{\text{price level}}}$$

- nominal zero coupon bond

$$\begin{aligned} P(t, T) &= E_t \left[ \frac{\xi(T)}{\xi(t)} \frac{\pi(t)}{\pi(T)} \right] \\ &= E_t \left[ \frac{\xi(T)}{\xi(t)} \right] E_t \left[ \frac{\pi(t)}{\pi(T)} \right] + \text{Cov}_t \left[ \frac{\xi(T)}{\xi(t)}, \frac{\pi(t)}{\pi(T)} \right] \\ &= \underbrace{B(t, T)}_{\text{real zero coupon bond}} E_t \left[ e^{-\underbrace{I(t, T)}_{\text{inflation}}} \right] + \underbrace{\text{Cov}_t \left[ \frac{\xi(T)}{\xi(t)}, e^{-I(t, T)} \right]}_{\text{inflation risk premium}} \end{aligned}$$

# Inflation and bond prices

$$P(t, T) = \underbrace{B(t, T)}_{\text{real zero cpn bond}} E_t \left[ e^{-\overbrace{I(t, T)}^{\text{inflation}}} \right] + \underbrace{\text{Cov}_t \left[ \frac{\xi(T)}{\xi(t)}, e^{-I(t, T)} \right]}_{\text{inflation risk premium}} \quad (1)$$

- Implications

- High expected inflation  $\rightarrow$  lower nominal bond price
- future inflation high in bad states  $\rightarrow$  lower nominal bond price

# Real yields and inflation

- Empirical results in this paper: differences in beliefs about **inflation**
  - Greater differences in beliefs: higher nominal yield, higher vol
  - Greater differences in beliefs: higher **real** yield, higher vol
  - $B(t, T) = E_t \left[ \frac{\xi(T)}{\xi(t)} \right]$  impacted by inflation expectations!
  
- Question: How can we justify this in a consumption - based equilibrium model?
  - How can differences in beliefs about inflation impact the value of a real cash flow when consumption is exogenous?
  - Obvious response: consumption and inflation are correlated.
  - This paper has a different answer

# Model

- Output and price level

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{d\epsilon(t)}{\epsilon(t)} &= \mu_\epsilon dt + \sigma_\epsilon dz_\epsilon(t), \\ d\pi(t) &= \pi(t)x(t)dt + \sigma_{\pi,\epsilon} dz_\epsilon(t) + \sigma_{\pi,USD} dz_{USD}(t)\end{aligned}$$

- $x$  is mean reverting: differences in beliefs about rate of mean reversion and long run mean

- Preferences

$$e^{-\rho t} \frac{1}{1-\gamma} \left( \frac{c_k(t)}{x(t)} \right)^{1-\gamma}$$

- Complete markets: FOC of rep agent

$$\lambda_{1,0} m_1(t) e^{-\rho t} c_1(t)^{-\gamma} x(t)^{-(\gamma-1)} = \lambda_{2,0} m_2(t) e^{-\rho t} c_2(t)^{-\gamma} x(t)^{-(\gamma-1)}$$

- $m_k(t) = \frac{d\mathbb{P}_i(s)}{d\mathbb{P}(s)}$ , probability ratio (Radon - Nikodym derivative), exponential martingale

- $\gamma$  plays double role

- relative risk aversion: aversion to changes in consumption across states
- reciprocal of EIS: aversion to changes in consumption over time



# Theoretical result: SDF and Differences in beliefs

- FOC  $\rightarrow$  consumption sharing rule

$$\begin{aligned}\lambda_{1,0} m_{1,t} e^{-\rho t} c_1(t)^{-\gamma} x(t)^{-(\gamma-1)} &= \lambda_{2,0} m_{2,t} e^{-\rho t} c_2(t)^{-\gamma} x(t)^{-(\gamma-1)} \\ c_1(t) &= \frac{m_1(t)^{\frac{1}{\gamma}}}{m_1(t)^{\frac{1}{\gamma}} + m_2(t)^{\frac{1}{\gamma}}} \epsilon(t)\end{aligned}$$

- consumption sharing rule  $\rightarrow$  SDF

$$\begin{aligned}\xi(t) &= m_k(t) c_k(t)^{-\gamma} x(t)^{-(\gamma-1)} \\ &= \left( \frac{\epsilon(t)}{x(t)} \right)^{-(\gamma-1)} \underbrace{\epsilon(t)^{-1} \left( m_1(t)^{\frac{1}{\gamma}} + m_2(t)^{\frac{1}{\gamma}} \right)^\gamma}_{\text{diff. in beliefs abt inflation}}\end{aligned}$$

- $\gamma = 1$  (EIS = 1, sub. and income effects cancel),  $B(t, T)$  not impacted by consumption risk sharing, differences in beliefs don't matter (Yan & Xiong, 2010)
- $\gamma > 1$  (EIS < 1, income effect dominates),  $B(t, T)$  impacted by consumption risk sharing, (this paper)

# Mechanics

- price of real bond

$$B(t, T) = E_t \left[ \left( \frac{\epsilon(T)}{x(T)} \right)^{-(\gamma-1)} \left( \frac{\epsilon(t)}{x(t)} \right)^{(\gamma-1)} \frac{\epsilon(T)^{-1}}{\epsilon(t)^{-1}} \left( \frac{m_1(T)^{\frac{1}{\gamma}} + m_2(T)^{\frac{1}{\gamma}}}{m_1(t)^{\frac{1}{\gamma}} + m_2(t)^{\frac{1}{\gamma}}} \right)^\gamma \right]$$

- Inflation shocks independent of output shocks

$$B(t, T) = E_t \left[ \underbrace{\left( \frac{\epsilon(T)}{x(T)} \right)^{-(\gamma-1)} \left( \frac{\epsilon(t)}{x(t)} \right)^{(\gamma-1)} \frac{\epsilon(T)^{-1}}{\epsilon(t)^{-1}}}_{\text{indep. of diff. in beliefs}} \underbrace{\left( \frac{m_1(T)^{\frac{1}{\gamma}} + m_2(T)^{\frac{1}{\gamma}}}{m_1(t)^{\frac{1}{\gamma}} + m_2(t)^{\frac{1}{\gamma}}} \right)^\gamma}_{\text{dep. on diff. in beliefs}} \right]$$

- $\gamma = 1$  (Yan & Xiong, 2010), income and sub. effects cancel

$$E_t \left[ \left( \frac{m_1(T)^{\frac{1}{\gamma}} + m_2(T)^{\frac{1}{\gamma}}}{m_1(t)^{\frac{1}{\gamma}} + m_2(t)^{\frac{1}{\gamma}}} \right)^\gamma \right] = E_t \left[ \underbrace{\left( \frac{m_1(T) + m_2(T)}{m_1(t) + m_2(t)} \right)}_{\text{sum of 2 martingales}} \right] = 1$$

- $\gamma > 1$  (this paper), income effect dominates

# Question: Nominal Rigidities

What makes inflation matter?

- 1 Traditional nominal rigidities in macro
  - Sticky prices and sticky wages
- 2 New nominal rigidities in macro
  - Sticky corporate leverage [Bhamra, Fisher & Kuehn (2011), Gomes, Jermann & Schmid (2013)]

How important is disagreement about inflation for macro-finance (via risk sharing channel)?

# Inflation indexed bonds

A way to test whether disagreement about inflation really matters.

- In the model: inflation indexed bonds are a perfect hedge against inflation if you hold them to maturity, but earlier prices are not independent of inflation.
- Compute  $\frac{\partial B(t, T)}{\partial \pi(t)}$  and  $\frac{\partial B(t, T)}{\partial x(t)}$  to see how large they are.
- Do we see same signs and magnitudes empirically?

## Recap: this paper

- Lucas endowment economy
- Agents with CRRA+ multiplicative external habit and **different beliefs about inflation**
- Asset-Pricing Application: **term structure of interest rates**

There is more to asset pricing than term structure of bonds.

There is more to household heterogeneity than differences in beliefs.

# Asset-Pricing

- 1 Real risk-free and Nominal risk-free Bonds
  - Term structure
  - Vol, Inflation effects
- 2 Corporate Bonds
  - Credit Spread Puzzle, Leverage Puzzle,
  - Vol, Term structure
  - Cross-section
  - Inflation effects
- 3 Equities
  - Equity Risk Premium Spread Puzzle, Term structure
  - Sharpe Ratio Puzzle, Term Structure
  - Vol, Term structure
  - **Predicability**
  - Cross-section
  - Inflation effects
- 4 FX
  - UIP, Vol, ...

We would like one model which explains everything!

How well does the model in this paper do for equity return vol?

# Equity return vol

- Disagreement about expected consumption growth and CRRA preferences: need  $\gamma < 1$  (EIS > 1) to get equity return vol above dividend growth vol
- Is the same true with disagreement about inflation? Probably.
- With CRRA and differences in beliefs, cannot simultaneously match bond and equity market facts.
- Need to separate RRA and EIS (e.g. EZW), introduce heterogeneity in RRA, or **add habits**

This paper already has habits

- easy to simultaneously match equity return vol. and equity risk premium in addition to term structures of real and nominal bonds?
- What about time series predictability?

## Equities: time series predictability

- Model: disagreement about expected endowment growth rate, no learning
- Look at correlation between the log price-dividend ratio,  $\ln \frac{P_t^Y}{Y_t}$ , and the realized excess return on the market  $j$  years later,  $R_{t+j}^Y$ , for  $j \in \{1, 2, 3, 5, 7\}$ .
- All returns are annualized, model-based results are estimated on the basis of 50,000 years of simulated data.

$j$ (years)	$Corr_t \left( \ln \frac{P_t^Y}{Y_t}, R_{t+j}^Y \right)$				
	1	2	3	5	7
Data	-0.18	-0.27	-0.08	-0.21	-0.05
Model:					
none	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.01
disagreement	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.01

Disagreement about expected endowment growth rate irrelevant for time series predictability of stock returns.



# Equities: time series predictability II

Bhamra & Uppal (2013)

$j$ (years)	$Corr_t \left( \ln \frac{P_t^Y}{Y_t}, R_{t+j}^Y \right)$				
	1	2	3	5	7
Data	-0.18	-0.27	-0.08	-0.21	-0.05
Model:					
none	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.01
disagreement	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.01
heterogeneity in RRA	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06	-0.05	-0.03

Disagreement about expected endowment growth rate irrelevant for time series predictability of stock returns.

Need to look at other forms of heterogeneity. [Chan & Kogan (2002)]

# Conclusion

- In data: real yields impacted by differences in beliefs about inflation
- Nice theoretical result: real yields impacted by differences in beliefs about inflation even when inflation is independent of output. Driven by risk sharing across agents with different beliefs.
- How does disagreement about inflation compare with nominal rigidities?
- Can we do more than just look at risk-free bonds?
- Explore other forms of heterogeneity to match a wider set of asset pricing facts.